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Quality Overprovision in Cable Television Markets†
By Gregory S. Crawford, Oleksandr Shcherbakov, and Matthew Shum*
We measure the welfare distortions from endogenous quality choice 
in imperfectly competitive markets. For US cable television markets 
between 1997–2006, prices are 33 percent to 74 percent higher and 
qualities 23 percent to 55 percent higher than socially optimal. Such 
quality overprovision contradicts classic results in the literature and 
our analysis shows that it results from the presence of competition 
from high-end satellite TV providers: without the competitive pres-
sure from satellite companies, cable TV monopolists would instead 
engage in quality degradation. For welfare, quality overprovision 
implies cable customers would prefer smaller, lower-quality cable 
bundles at a lower price, amounting to a twofold increase in con-
sumer surplus for the average consumer. (JEL L13, L15, L82)
Market power over price is one of the most widely understood and enduring 
concepts in economics. Whereas competitive markets, under standard assump-
tions, ensure the maximization of welfare, market power over price creates a wedge 
between the marginal social benefits and costs of production, introducing ineffi-
ciency in the form of deadweight loss. It is not surprising, then, that market power 
over price is the primary focus of antitrust and competition law and economics.1
There is much less focus on concerns about market power over quality, or over 
non-price attributes more generally.2 Just as they do with prices, firms in imper-
fectly competitive industries will distort quality levels away from socially optimal 
levels, but unlike prices, the direction of this distortion is not clear. Spence (1975) 
1 Examples include price-fixing, predatory pricing, and attempted monopolization, among others (Elhauge 
2011). Similarly, the primary concern of merger review is exercise of market power over price due to unilateral or 
coordinated action (DOJ and FTC 2010). 
2 DOJ and FTC (2010, chapter 1) is a notable exception, stating, “Enhanced market power can also be mani-
fested in non-price terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product quality, reduced 
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shows that a single-product monopolist may offer more or less quality than a social 
planner in the same market. There is a consensus view in the screening literature 
that cable monopolists degrade quality (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Maskin and Riley 
1984). Despite this consensus, Champsaur and Rochet (1989) show that when con-
sumers face high-end outside options, then the incentives may reverse, resulting in 
“quality overprovision” relative to the first best, making it an empirical question as 
to whether market power leads to over- or underprovision of quality in real-world 
settings.
In this paper, we measure the welfare effects of endogenous quality choice by 
US cable television systems. We estimate an equilibrium demand and supply model 
of consumers’ choices across television bundles offered by cable and satellite TV 
companies. Based on the results, we compute how much offered qualities differ 
from those given by a welfare-maximizing social planner.
Importantly, we find that firms choosing both price and quality in the cable TV 
market tend to set both prices and quality too high relative to first-best socially 
optimal levels. This evidence for “quality overprovision” is novel compared to the 
classic results in the theoretical literature discussed above. Digging deeper to exam-
ine the sources of the quality overprovision result, we find that it is the presence of 
satellite TV competitors, who provide high-end substitutes for cable TV companies’ 
offerings, which drive the quality overprovision result, rather than the rich consumer 
preference heterogeneity that we allow for in our demand model.
Our analysis builds on and extends previous empirical research looking at related 
questions.3 Berry and Waldfogel (2001) and Sweeting (2010) empirically analyze 
the effects of increased market power on product variety and/or quality, but do not 
optimally solve for those qualities. Clerides (2002) and Verboven (2002) analyze 
quality-based price discrimination, but focus primarily on documenting its pres-
ence. Where the types of products a firm can offer are discrete, the choice facing 
firms is whether to add any such product. In this vein, Draganska, Mazzeo, and 
Seim (2009); Eizenberg (2014); Nosko (2014); and Sweeting (2013) recover the 
fixed costs of offering new products and, in some cases, endogenously solve for new 
product introductions. Gandhi et al. (2008), Chu (2010), Fan (2013), and Byrne 
(2015) study firms’ endogenous choices of continuous characteristics while holding 
the set of products fixed, as in this paper. Finally, we contribute to the literature 
analyzing economic issues in pay television markets (Goolsbee and Petrin 2004, 
Crawford and Yurukoglu 2012, Crawford et al. 2018).
The papers closest in spirit to ours are McManus (2007) and Crawford and Shum 
(2007). Both find evidence of quality degradation for low-quality products along 
the lines predicted by the theoretical literature above. Here, in contrast, using more 
flexible specification of preferences, we find evidence of quality overprovision, even 
for low-quality products, which is a novel finding in the empirical literature.
The empirical framework we propose is based closely on the empirical analysis 
of differentiated product markets pioneered by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, 
 product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation.” They go on to say, “When the Agencies investigate 
whether a merger may lead to a substantial lessening of non-price competition, they employ an approach analogous 
to that used to evaluate price competition,” but do not provide details. 
3 See Crawford (2012, Section 5) for more details about the related literature. 
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and Pakes (1995).4 On the demand side, we specify a discrete-choice demand model 
with random coefficients on price and quality. We specify a total cost function which 
depends on both quantity and quality. Cable systems maximize profits by choosing 
optimally the price and quality of the products they choose to offer.5 Estimation is 
by generalized method of moments (GMM) using moments generated by demand 
and the first-order conditions for prices and qualities. Demand, marginal (quantity) 
cost, and marginal quality cost shifters serve as instruments.6
We estimate the model on a dataset of almost 12,000 cable system years between 
1997 and 2006. We also incorporate annual data on prices and qualities for satellite 
competitors over the same period. US cable television markets during our sample 
period are well suited for our model for three reasons. First, the products that cable 
systems offer are bundles of television networks with higher-quality bundles uni-
formly including all of the networks in lower-quality bundles (and more). Limiting 
an empirical analysis to a single dimension of product quality is therefore reason-
able in this setting. Second, there is interesting variation in the competition faced 
by systems in the sample. In the early part of our sample, cable television systems 
are largely local monopolies; while satellite competitors entered in the mid-1990s, 
regulations on their ability to import local broadcast networks before 2000 limited 
their ability to compete with incumbent cable systems.7 Finally, our data on cable 
(and satellite) markets are rich enough to accurately analyze endogenous quality. 
Cable systems in our data serve geographically distinct local cable markets. Within 
the sample, each offers at most three bundles of networks. For each offered bundle, 
we observe the price charged, its market share, and the television networks it offers. 
Following previous work in this literature (Chu 2010, Shcherbakov 2016), we use a 
weighted total number of television networks in a bundle as our measure of quality 
for that bundle, with weights for each channel given by the national average input 
costs paid by cable systems for that channel.8 We also observe (at the market level) 
variables that shift demand and costs across markets.
Based on our estimates of preferences and costs, we calculate consumer surplus, 
profit, and thus total surplus associated with observed prices and qualities. We then 
simulate counterfactual prices and qualities for a social planner offering the same 
number of products and maximizing total surplus in each market and compare the 
qualities offered in the market with those offered by a social planner.
Our results show that, compared to the social optimum, a profit-maximizing 
monopolist sets both price and quality too high: that is, the monopolist overpro-
4 Applications using this framework are too numerous to count but include measuring the market power of firms 
(Nevo 2001), conducting simulations of potential mergers (Berry and Pakes 1993), testing for price discrimination 
(Verboven 2002), and quantifying the welfare benefits of new goods (Petrin 2002). 
5 The number of offered products depends on the technology used by cable systems and is therefore plausibly 
exogenous to annual price and quality decisions. 
6 Our framework also addresses the endogeneity of quality in the estimation of demand, an important econo-
metric problem in its own right. Relatedly, see Ackerberg, Crawford, and Hahn (2011) for methods to consistently 
estimate (only) price elasticities in the presence of endogenous product characteristics, which can be multidimen-
sional (unlike the case of scalar quality considered here). 
7 Furthermore, while cable system prices were regulated in 1992, the effects of these regulations were mitigated 
due to the nature of their implementation and were effectively withdrawn for the vast majority of cable bundles by 
1996. See Crawford and Shum (2007) for more detail on the regulations and the effects they had on cable market 
quality. 
8 Thus, channels that are expensive to the cable system (ESPN, TNT, CNN, etc.) contribute more to the mea-
sured quality of a cable bundle than channels that are inexpensive to the system. 
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vides quality. We estimate that a social planner would lower qualities by between 23 
percent and 55 percent (and prices by between 33 percent and 74 percent). A wide 
range of robustness checks and additional simulations establish that this result is 
robust to changes in model parameters and specifications. While this evidence for 
quality overprovision by cable operators reverses previous theoretical and empiri-
cal results (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Crawford and Shum 2007) emphasizing that a 
monopolist distorts quality downward, it provides empirical confirmation of theo-
retical results from Champsaur and Rochet (1989), who show how a monopolist fac-
ing competition from a high-end outside option may optimally overprovide quality 
to its consumers. Indeed, additional results suggest that it is the presence of high-end 
satellite competition which drives the overprovision result; when we remove satel-
lite competition, then the result essentially disappears.
In addition, the quality overprovision results implies that cable customers 
would prefer lower-quality (i.e., smaller) cable bundles at a lower price, and mov-
ing to this socially-optimal product line would generate, on average, a more-than-
twofold increase in consumer surplus. Such a finding opens up an important new 
perspective for US policymakers concerned about high and rising pay television 
prices.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
economic intuition underlying the measurement of market power over quality. In 
Section II, we describe the institutional features of US cable television markets 
that make estimating the model there attractive as well as the data we are using 
for our analysis. In Section III, we describe the equilibrium demand and supply 
framework underlying our empirical model. In Section IV, we elaborate on details 
of model specification, and discuss the identification of structural parameters and 
our choice of instrumental variables for estimation. Section V presents our estima-
tion results, and also the results from counterfactual experiments which compare 
the observed prices and qualities to socially optimal values. Section VI delves into 
the robustness of and explanations for the quality overprovision result. Section 
VII concludes.
I. Market Power over Quality
In this section, we describe the economic intuition underlying market power over 
quality. Following Spence (1975), we begin with the simplest case where a single 
product monopolist chooses quality,  q , and price,  P , and each consumer buys one 
unit of the good. Let  P(s, q) denote the inverse demand function facing the monop-
olist, where  s denotes quantity, and let  C(s, q) = c(q)s be a constant returns to 
scale cost function. The monopolist’s first-order conditions for quantity and quality 
controls are then
(1)  F.O.C . M [s]: P(s, q) +  P s (s, q)s = c(q),
(2) F.O.C . M [q]:  P q (s, q) =  c q (q),  
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where  P q (s, q) is Spence’s “marginal valuation of quality” ( MVQ ) for the  sth 
consumer.9
A social planner maximizes total surplus
  max s,q  { ∫ 0 s P(s′, q) ds′ − c(q)s} , 
yielding first-order conditions (FOC) for quantity and quality that equate the mar-
ginal social benefit of each with their marginal cost,10
(3)  F.O.C . SP [s]: P(s, q) = c(q),
(4) F.O.C . SP [q]:  1 _s  ∫ 0 s P q (s′, q) ds′ =  c q (q). 
While the difference between (1) and (3) is familiar as a manifestation of market 
power over price, the difference between (2) and (4) shows that profit maximizing 
and socially optimal quality levels are also likely to be different. While the monop-
olist equates the marginal quality cost,  c q (q) , to the marginal value of quality for 
the marginal (s th ) consumer,  P q (s, q) , the social planner equates it to the marginal 
value of quality to the marginal value of quality, averaged across all consumers, 
 1 _s  ∫ 0 s  P q (s′, q) ds ′.
In our empirical model below, preference heterogeneity is multidimensional, 
depending on the distribution of random coefficients and utility shocks which vary 
across households as well as across product offerings. In this more complex, but 
arguably more realistic setup, we cannot define “marginal” or “inframarginal” con-
sumers. Nevertheless, Spence’s main insight remains, that market power can lead to 
either over- or underprovision of quality (relative to the social planner) depending 
on households’ preferences.
Models of multi-product monopoly quality choice typically apply principal-agent 
models of adverse selection like those used in the analysis of optimal nonlinear 
pricing. Seminal papers in this area include Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin 
and Riley (1984). Under standard assumptions, a common set of results emerge: (i) 
quality to the highest type is set efficiently (i.e., there are no “Spence-ian” distor-
tions at the top of the type distribution), (ii) qualities to lower types are degraded 
downward, (iii) prices are set such that the lowest type receives no surplus, and (iv) 
higher types earn positive surplus (information rents).
However, an important restriction in this model is that the consumers’ main alter-
native to the monopolist’s offerings are a low-quality outside option; this drives the 
quality degradation result as the monopolist will optimally engage in quality degrada-
tion to low-valuation consumers in order to extract more surplus from  high-valuation 
consumers. It turns out that this result depends crucially on the location of the outside 
option on the quality spectrum; indeed, Champsaur and Rochet (1989, Section 3) 
show that, if one were to make the outside option a  high-end  alternative, then the 
9 If  P(s, q) measures the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of the  sth consumer, then  P q (s, q) measures how much her 
WTP increases with increases in quality. 
10 Equation (4) assumes that differentiation under the integral sign is possible, which is satisfied for the paramet-
ric demand specifications considered in this paper, which are continuously differentiable. 
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result can reverse; that is, the monopolist may overprovide quality in order to opti-
mally extract surplus from its consumers. This may be a relevant scenario for cable 
television markets, as an important alternative to the cable companies’ offerings are 
those of direct-broadcast satellite (DBS) providers, who offer more extensive (larger) 
and (often) more expensive bundles relative to cable TV bundles.
As this summary of the theory has highlighted, market power can lead to either 
quality over- or underprovision, depending on features of consumer heterogeneity 
and preferences, as well as market structure and competition. Ultimately, then, the 
direction of cable monopolists’ quality distortions is an empirical question, which 
we focus on in what follows.
II. Data and Institutional Details
Cable television, formerly known as Community Antenna Television (CATV), 
emerged in the late 1940s in Arkansas, Oregon, and Pennsylvania to deliver broad-
cast signals to the remote areas with poor over-the-air reception.11 In these areas, 
homes were connected to the antenna towers located at the high points via cable 
networks. Starting with 70 cable systems serving about 14,000 subscribers in 1952, 
a decade later almost 800 cable systems served about 850,000 subscribers. By 
October 1998, the number of cable systems reached 10,700, providing service to 
more than 65 million subscribers in 32,000 communities (FCC 2000).
Specifically, cable television systems select a portfolio of programming net-
works, bundle them into one or more services and offer these services to households 
in local, geographically separate, cable markets. Systems typically offer three types 
of networks: broadcast networks, cable networks, and premium networks.12
Broadcast and cable networks are typically bundled by cable systems and offered 
as Basic Service. Some systems, however, elect to split up these networks and offer 
a subset of them as Expanded Basic Services. Starting in the late 1990s, cable sys-
tems invested in digital technologies, allowing them to offer more television signals 
on a given infrastructure. At this time, they often introduced additional bundles of 
networks called Digital Basic Services. Expanded and Digital Basic Services were 
only available to households who had purchased the Basic Service bundle.
The institutional and economic environment in the cable television industry sug-
gests the choice of quality and price of Basic, Expanded Basic, and Digital Basic 
Services may map well to the theory. Since households that buy Expanded and 
Digital Basic Services must necessarily first purchase Basic Service, these services 
are by construction increasing in overall quality. Furthermore, since they consist 
of (generally large) bundles of individual networks, the range of qualities possibly 
chosen is plausibly continuous, and offered qualities are clearly discrete.13
11 See National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA), http://www.ncta.com/About/About/
HistoryofCableTelevision.aspx (accessed March 1, 2009). 
12 Broadcast networks are television signals broadcast in the local cable market and then collected and retransmit-
ted by cable systems. Examples include the major national broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX) as well 
as public and independent television stations. Cable networks are advertising-supported general and  special-interest 
networks distributed nationally to systems via satellite, such as MTV, CNN, and ESPN. Premium networks are adver-
tising-free entertainment networks, typically offering full-length feature films, such as HBO and Showtime. 
13 In a complementary line of analysis, Crawford (2008) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) consider 
the incentives to bundle networks into Basic Services. This line of work tests the discriminatory incentives to 
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An important feature of cable system management is their almost complete con-
trol over the content (quality) and price of their bundles. While certain regulations 
mandate systems carry all broadcast television stations available over the air in their 
service area (so-called “must-carry” requirements), beyond these restrictions they 
may select and package whatever television networks they like for sale to house-
holds.14 With respect to prices, cable systems have been subject to cyclical regula-
tory oversight.15 Most recently, the 1996 Telecommunications Act removed price 
controls on Expanded and Digital Basic Services, leaving only Basic Service subject 
to possible, though extremely weak regulation.
Until the 1990s, local cable systems were effectively natural monopolies as they 
faced virtually no competition except in a few cases of “overbuilt” systems where 
the same location was served by more than one cable company. Direct broadcast 
satellite (DBS) service was launched in the early 90s and originally was popular 
mostly in rural areas where cable service did not exist. Since then the number of 
subscribers of DBS providers has experienced rapid growth, as shown in Table 1.
DBS and cable operators use different quality and price setting strategies. While 
satellite operators set prices and products uniformly at the national level, cable sys-
tems make pricing and programming decisions locally. We model this difference 
by assuming that the evolution of satellite product and price options changes exog-
enously over time and that cable televisions systems respond strategically to these 
changes. In each local market, cable television systems are still therefore monopo-
lists, but face a residual demand curve which depends on the presence and product 
choices of satellite TV operators.16
We have compiled a market-level dataset on a cross section of United States 
cable systems to estimate the model. The primary source of data for these systems 
is Warren Publishing’s Television and Cable Factbook Directory of Cable Systems. 
The data for this paper consist of the population of cable systems recorded in the 
bundle: namely that by reducing heterogeneity in consumer tastes, bundling implicitly sorts consumers in a 
manner similar to  second-degree price discrimination. 
14 Must-carry requirement do not appear to be a binding constraint on the firms’ bundle choices, as the pro-
portion of free of charge networks included in cable firms’ bundles (an upper bound on the fraction of must-carry 
channels) is typically quite small. 
15 The most recent incident of price regulation was the 1992 Cable Act, the intent of which was to limit the prices 
charged for Basic and Expanded Basic Services. Due to a combination of factors, including strategic responses by 
cable systems to the imposed regulations and relatively weak cost pass-through (going-forward) requirements, 
these provided little benefit to households (Hazlett and Spitzer 1997, Crawford 2000). 
16 This accurately characterizes the pay television market in the sample period (1997–2006). During these 
years, DBS companies (Dish and DirecTV) set their products and prices at a nationwide level, whereas individ-
ual cable systems were permitted significant discretion in setting their channel lineups and prices to match local 
demand conditions, even when they were part of a larger Multiple System Operator (MSO, e.g., Comcast or Time 
Warner). In such a market context, even if DBS companies were to respond to cable firms, they would do so at a 
national level, and such a response would be diffused and of second-order importance for local-market outcomes. 
Table 1—DBS Penetration Rates in 2001–2004 (Percentages) 
2001 2004 Change
Rural 26 29 12
Suburban 14 18 29
Urban 9 13 44
Source: Government Accountability Office report to the US Senate, April 2005
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1997–2006 editions of the Factbook for which complete information was avail-
able.17 From the population, a sample of 3,931 systems remained. An observation 
in the data is a cable system-year.
Table 2 presents sample statistics for selected variable for these systems. Cable 
systems varied in the number of years they were in the sample, ranging from one to 
nine years, implying an unbalanced panel. Sample cable systems offer between one 
and three bundles, while satellite systems offer between three and six (with exactly 
three from 2002).18 We measure the quality of a bundle by the weighted average 
of the number of television networks offered on that bundle. The weights are given 
by the national average input cost (affiliate fee) paid by cable systems for that net-
work, which is the carriage cost negotiated between that network and cable sys-
tems, averaged across all cable systems nationwide. This follows earlier empirical 
work by Chu (2010) and Shcherbakov (2016). As expected, prices and qualities are 
increasing across product tiers.19 Moreover, we see that at every tier (low, medium, 
or high), the measured quality of satellite bundles exceeds that of cable bundles, 
which can be interpreted to imply that in these markets, satellite products provide a 
high-end alternative to cable products. This observation will play an important role 
in what follows.
Figure 1 presents histograms for aggregate cable and satellite market shares as 
well as for product-specific cable market shares.
A. Preliminary Evidence of Quality Over-/Underprovision
The theory literature beginning with Mussa and Rosen (1978) connects 
market power with quality degradation for low-quality products offered by 
multi-product firms, and Crawford and Shum (2007) investigated whether indeed 
 prices-per-channel in cable markets were higher for low-quality cable services. In 
Table 3, we present some exploratory evidence of quality degradation along the 
lines of Crawford and Shum (2007), using both their measure of product quality, 
price-per-channel, as well as the measure of product quality for which we advo-
cate above,  price-per-weighted-channel, with weights given by the national average 
input fee for each channel.
The evidence is largely inconclusive. While there is some evidence of higher 
prices-per-channel for lower-quality cable services, the significant heterogene-
ity in the raw underlying data prevents the differences from being statistically 
significant.
Going one step further, Champsaur and Rochet’s (1989) model shows that a 
monopolist may engage in quality overprovision, when it faces competition from 
17 While there are over 11,000 systems per year in the sample, persistence in non-response over time as well as 
incomplete reporting of critical variables required imposing a large number of conditions in order for a system to 
be included in each sample. Missing information on prices, quantities, and reporting dates were responsible for the 
majority of the exclusions. 
18 Satellite market shares are only available at a much wider level of aggregation than cable shares. Satellite 
data are reported for each of 210 Nielsen Designated Market Areas (DMA), each of which typically contain 
many local cable system markets. Following Chu (2007), in order to compute satellite market share in each cable 
market, we assume that within a DMA satellite subscribers constitute a constant proportion of the non-cable 
subscribers. 
19 Prices for cable and satellite services were adjusted by Consumer Price Index (CPI) with 1997 as the base year. 
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a high-end substitute. We look for reduced-form evidence of this by analyzing 
 variation in the presence of the high-end (satellite) outside option across markets; 
specifically, variation in when DBS begin carrying local channels and, thus, become 
a true “high-end” substitute for cable services. These data are available for about 
6,610 markets (54 percent of total number of markets). Table 4 summarizes the 
Table 2—Data Summary Statistics, 1997–2006 
Mean SD Min Max
Periods and products
Time periods, years 2.1 1.2 1 9
Cable products 1.5 0.7 1 3
Satellite products 5.2 1.4 3 6
Market shares
sc 0.54 0.19 0.05 0.90
s s 0.15 0.12 0.01 0.88
Prices
Cable
  p Low 
c $20.44 $7.71 $2.68 $81.86
  p Med 
c $32.77 $14.59 $7.88 $136.30
  p High 
c $60.28 $23.79 $16.90 $291.08
Satellite
  p Low 
s $21.69 $9.33 $14.44 $39.24
  p Med 
s $27.15 $9.06 $19.26 $43.61
  p High 
s $45.95 $22.94 $28.89 $87.22
Quality
Cable
  q Low 
c 3.09 1.81 0.30 13.13
  q Med 
c 5.76 2.63 0.71 16.86
  q High 
c 9.11 3.45 2.34 19.02
Satellite
  q Low 
s 5.12 3.49 1.78 11.73
  q Med 
s 6.48 3.16 3.30 12.67
  q High 
s 10.77 6.51 5.65 27.88
Other variables
Length of cable network, miles 0.160 0.560 0.000 17.690
Channel capacity 44.9 20.2 5 542
Before 2002
 p Tier3 
s $35.98 $4.26 $32.75 $43.80
 p Tier4 
s $41.10 $2.92 $38.53 $46.59
 p Tier5 
s $54.67 $12.65 $46.23 $77.35
 q Tier3 
s 7.42 1.78 5.93 10.44
 q Tier4 
s 8.01 1.75 6.53 10.96
 q Tier5 
s 9.45 3.49 6.96 15.44
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for our estimation sample. Cable information is drawn from Warren 
Publishing’s Television and Cable Factbook; satellite information was collected by hand. There are as many as six 
satellite products until 2001 and only three afterward. Market shares reported in the table are aggregated across all 
products offered on each platform (cable, satellite). Prices are in 1997 dollars. Low (or the only one if 1 product), 
Medium (second highest across having 2+ products), and High (third among 3-product markets) quality or price 
products are indexed by  {0, 1, 2} in the modeling section. The quality of a product is the weighted average of the 
number of television networks offered on that product, with weights given by the national average input cost (affili-
ate fee) paid by cable systems for that network from SNL Kagan. Length of cable network measures the size of the 
physical cable network, while channel capacity measures the maximum number of channels a given cable system 
can broadcast using its current physical network and compression technology. These data are augmented with mar-
ket-level data on demographics from 2000 US Census. 
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results of this exercise.20 Across all markets and product tiers, we see evidence of 
higher quality when DBS offers local channels.21
As with any reduced-form analysis, there are a number of confounding factors. 
The launch date for local channels could be endogenous as regulations allowing 
DBS to carry local channels were first allowed in November 1999 (also known as 
the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act). If cable firms anticipate DBS launch-
ing local channels in the future, they may act preemptively. On the other hand, DBS 
may choose to launch local channels in markets that would experience high growth 
rates in the future.22 In this case, profitable developments in the market may affect 
both the decision of DBS to introduce local channels earlier and the decision of 
cable firms to improve product quality.
While suggestive, the reduced-form evidence here is uninformative as to how 
much a monopolist distorts quality and prices from their efficient levels. In order to 
quantify this, we specify and estimate a structural model of demand, pricing, and 
quality choice in cable television markets, which we introduce in the next section.
III. Model
Consider a market,  n , served by two providers of paid television service: cable 
and satellite, denoted with  g ∈ {c, s} , each offering multiple products indexed by 
20 Differences for each year are available upon request. 
21 In Appendix A, we present supplementary regression results which show that cable firms choose higher levels 
of quality in years close to the satellite competitor’s decision to carry local channels. 
22 In our data we cannot see this because our demographics are fixed at their values in year 2000. 
Figure 1. Histograms for Cable and Satellite Market Shares
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Market share of cable
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
F
ra
ct
io
n
F
ra
ct
io
n
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Market share of DBS
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Market share of
low cable product
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
F
ra
ct
io
n
F
ra
ct
io
n
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Market share of
medium cable product
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
F
ra
ct
io
n
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Market share of
high cable product
966 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2019
j ∈   gn . Our model is static and, for simplicity, we omit time subscripts such that 
n denotes both market and time. One can characterize a multi-product cable carrier 
offering  J cn distinct products by their monthly subscription fees,  p cjn , and quality of 
programming content,  q cjn , which we assume can be summarized by a scalar.
A. Demand
There are a continuum of consumers, indexed by  i , whose preferences for a prod-
uct  j offered by a provider  g depend on the monthly subscription fee,  p jgn , and ser-
vice quality,  q jgn , of that product. Let  i ’s indirect utility function be given by
(5)  U ijgn 
 =  {  δ gjn ( p gjn ,  q gjn ,  Y 
–
 in ,  ξ gn ;  ω i ) +  ϵ ign  for product j of provider g in market n    ϵ i0n  otherwise ,
Table 3—Exploratory Evidence of Quality Degradation 
Three-good markets Two-good markets
Mean Difference Mean Difference
Prices-per-channel
pc2/channel s2 1.28 (0.64) 0.46 (0.34) 1.38 (0.82) −0.31 (1.50)
pc1/channel s1 0.81 (0.40) −0.42 (0.87) 1.69 (1.50)
pc 0/channel s0 1.23 (1.04)
Prices-per-weighted-channel
pc2/qc2 7.27 (2.74) 2.03 (1.74) 6.60 (2.39) −4.26 (10.02)
pc1/qc1 5.24 (2.21) −5.11 (7.52) 10.86 (10.20)
pc 0/qc 0 10.34 (8.21)
Observations 1,360 3,727
Notes: Reported are the average price per channel and price per weighted channel for each ordered cable service 
in our estimation sample. Weights are given by the national average input cost for that channel in the relevant 
year. Values in the Difference columns are the difference in price per channel in that row and the row that follows. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 4—Cable Quality Choice and DBS Carriage of Local Channels 
Variable
DBS carriage 
of local channels
No DBS carriage 
of local channels Difference
1-product, qc 0 4.09 3.87 0.22
2-product, qc 0 4.51 3.97 0.54
2-product, qc1 6.38 5.94 0.44
3-product, qc 0 3.01 2.44 0.57
3-product, qc1 8.95 7.92 1.03
3-product, qc2 10.85 9.53 1.32
967CRAWFORD ET AL.: QUALITY OVERPROVISION IN CABLE TELEVISION MARKETSVOL. 109 NO. 3
where  ω i denotes consumer  i ’s heterogeneous preferences.23 These are assumed 
to be known to consumer  i , but unobserved by the econometrician. The term  ξ gn 
denotes unobserved characteristics of provider  g in market  n , and  Y 
–
in is a vector of 
observable demand shifters (e.g., consumer demographics). Both the unobserved 
characteristics,  ξ gn , and the idiosyncratic preference draw,  ϵ ign , are provider-spe-
cific and not product-specific (i.e., both depend on  g instead of  j ). There are several 
reasons for these assumptions. First, they are consistent with the institutional fea-
tures of the industry, where higher-quality products always include all program-
ming content carried on low-quality products. The second reason is data-driven. 
For a large number of markets, we do not observe product-specific cable market 
shares, e.g., these data are missing for 15 percent of observations in 2-product mar-
kets and 35 percent of observations in 3-product markets. Therefore, allowing for 
product-specific unobservables would reduce our sample considerably. (We never 
observe satellite product-specific market shares and, therefore, cannot model prod-
uct-specific unobservables for the DBS alternative.) We assume  ϵ ign is distributed as 
Type I Extreme Value.
Total Provider Shares.—Let  p –gn and  q –gn denote observable vectors of prices and 
quality levels for all products offered by provider  g ∈ {c, s} in market  n and let 
the maximum utility a consumer type  i achieves by choosing among the products 
offered by provider  g be given by
(6)  δ gn (  p –gn ,  q –gn ,  Y – in ,  ξ g ;  ω i ) =  max j′∈  gn  { δ gj′n (  p gj′n ,  q gj′n ,  Y 
–
 in ,  ξ gn ;  ω i )} .
Because  ϵ ign is common to all the indirect utilities,  U igj′n ,  ∀ j′ ∈   gn , it doesn’t influ-
ence the choice of product within provider for consumer type  i .
The probability that a consumer of type  i chooses  g in  n is given by
(7)  P gn ( ω i ) =  exp ( δ gn (  p 
–
gn ,  q –gn ,  Y – in ,  ξ gn ;  ω i ))    ________________________________________  
1 + exp ( δ cn (  p –cn ,  q –cn ,  Y – in ,  ξ cn ;  ω i )) + exp ( δ sn (  p –sn ,  q –sn ,  Y – in ,  ξ sn ;  ω i )), 
and the aggregate market share of  g in  n is obtained by integrating over the distribu-
tion of consumer heterogeneity,  dF( ω i ) :
(8)  s gn =  ∫   
 exp ( δ gn (  p –gn ,  q –gn ,  Y – in ,  ξ gn ;  ω i ))    ________________________________________  
1 + exp ( δ cn (  p –cn ,  q –cn ,  Y – in ,  ξ cn ;  ω i )) + exp ( δ sn (  p –sn ,  q –sn ,  Y – in ,  ξ sn ;  ω i )) dF( ω i ). 
From the definition of  δ gn ( · ) and equation (8) it follows that
  s gn =  s gn (  p –cn ,  q –cn ,  p –sn ,  q –sn ,  Y – n ,  ξ cn ,  ξ sn ;  θ d ), 
where  ξ cn and  ξ sn are the only two unobservable to the econometrician provider char-
acteristics and  θ d is a vector of demand parameters that includes parameters govern-
ing the distribution of  ω i and measuring the influence of demographic variables,  Y – n . 
23 In the empirical model below, they will include random coefficients on price and quality. 
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Under standard assumptions, we can use the Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, 
and Pakes (1995) inversion to solve the system of equations
(9)  {  s cn =  s cn (  p 
–
cn ,  q –cn ,  p –sn ,  q –sn ,  Y – n ,  ξ cn ,  ξ sn ;  θ d )     s sn =  s sn (  p –cn ,  q –cn ,  p –sn ,  q –sn ,  Y – n ,  ξ cn ,  ξ sn ;  θ d ) ,
for a pair ( ξ cn ,  ξ sn ) that makes observed cable and satellite market shares ( left-hand-side variables) equal to the ones predicted by our model.
Conditional Product-Specific Shares.—For most markets in our data, we do not 
observe product-specific shares. However, for the markets for which  product-specific 
shares are available, we do not discard them as they are informative about con-
sumer price and quality preference parameters. Hence, to incorporate these data, let 
 P jgn ( ω i ) denote the probability that consumer type  i chooses product  j of provider  g 
in market  n . Let  s j | g, n denote the market share of tier  j given the choice of provider 
g with  ∑ j∈  gn    s j | g,n = 1 by construction. Then the model’s prediction for this share 
is described by the following equation:
(10)   s j | g,n =   ∫   
 
 1( j =  arg max  j′∈ g  { δ gj′ (  p gj′ ,  q gj′ ,  Y – in ,  ξ g ;  ω i )} P gn ( ω i ) dF( ω i )      _________________________________________________  
 ∫   
 
 P gn ( ω i ) dF( ω i ) .
Since there are no structural errors here, we introduce measurement error  u to 
explain differences between predicted and observed values of product-specific 
shares,
(11)  s j | g,n =  s j | g,n (  p –cn ,  q –cn ,  p –sn ,  q –sn ,  Y – n ,  ξ cn ,  ξ sn ;  θ d ) +  u gjn . 
B. Supply
We model optimal price and quality decisions by the local cable system in each 
market,  n . As alluded to earlier, we treat satellite providers’ prices and products as 
set exogenously.
ASSUMPTION 1: The satellite competitor is a nonstrategic player in the sense that 
it does not react to policies ( prices, qualities) chosen by local cable systems.
The per-subscriber marginal cost of providing product  j in market  n is
(12)  m c cjn = mc( q cjn ,  Z cn ;  θ s ), 
where  Z cn denotes a vector of observable cost shifters, and  θ s is a vector of  supply-side 
cost parameters. Together with the assumption that market size does not change over 
time, this allows us to write the maximization problem for a cable system as follows:
(13)  max  { p cjn ,  q cjn } j∈  cn   { ∑ j∈  cn   s cjn (  p 
–
cn ,  q –cn ,  p –sn ,  q –sn ,  ξ cn ,  ξ sn ;  θ d )(  p cjn − mc( q cjn ,  Z cn ;  θ s ))} .
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This specification assumes that the marginal quantity cost of providing cable service 
is constant across subscribers (i.e., no economies or diseconomies of scale), but that 
this (constant) marginal cost increases with the quality of the offered service. This 
specification fits well the cable industry where the most important marginal costs 
facing systems are the input costs (affiliate fees) paid to television networks, which 
are constant per-subscriber fees.24
The first-order conditions for cable operators’ price and quality are
 (14)  F.O.C.[  p cjn ]:  s cjn +  ∑ 
r∈  cn 
 (  p crn − m c crn )  ∂ s crn  ___∂ p cjn = 0,
(15) F.O.C.[ q cjn ]: −  ∂ m c cjn  _____∂ q cjn   s cjn +  ∑ r∈  cn  (  p crn − m c crn )  
∂ s crn  ___∂ q cjn = 0. 
Equations (14) and (15) can be solved for the marginal cost levels,  m c cjn , and the 
derivatives of the marginal cost function,  ∂mc cjn / ∂q cjn , that rationalize observed 
price and quality choices given the parameters of the model (more on this in Section 
IVB).
We take the number of products offered by each cable system as given and exog-
enous to systems’ price and quality decisions. This is reasonable in cable markets 
because the number of products offered by cable systems often depends on the tech-
nology the system has in place and therefore plausibly exogenous to annual price 
and quality decisions.25
IV. Specification and Estimation
Here we fill in specification details for consumers’ utility and cable systems’ cost 
functions.
A. Demand
On the demand side, we assume that consumer utility net of additive i.i.d. shocks 
ϵ ign is a linear function of price, quality, and demographic characteristics,  Y – in :
(16)  δ gjn (  p gjn ,  q gjn ,  Y – in ,  ξ g ;  ω i ) =  α ip ( Y – in )  p gjn +  α iq ( Y – in ) q gjn +  ξ gn , 
where
(17)  α ip =  a i0 +  a y  I n +  a h  H n +  a u  U n ,
(18)  α iq =  b i0 +  b y  I n +  b h  H n +  b u  U n , 
24 See Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) for more details about these contracts. 
25 Similar timing assumptions are invoked in the empirical measurement of productivity (e.g., Olley and Pakes 
1996, Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2015). More generally, the model in the paper can be thought of as the second 
stage of a larger model in which firms choose first the number of products before choosing the quality levels of 
each product. As such, we should interpret our findings of quality overprovision below as a short-run effect when 
adjusting the number of products is not possible; in the long run, such distortions may change as firms change the 
number of products they offer. 
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and  I n stands for income,  H n for household size, and  U n for the level of urbaniza-
tion in market  n . These market-level variables are assumed to have the same effect 
on the price and quality sensitivity parameters for all consumer types. Two addi-
tional parameters  a i0 and  b i0 are  i -specific and have a flexible variance-covariance 
matrix, i.e.,
(19)  (  a i0   b i0 ) ∼ N (  a 
–
0 
 
 b 
–
0 
, Σ) , Σ =  (  σ a 
2
 
 ρ ab  
 ρ  ab   σ b 2 ) .
On the demand side we estimate the parameters
  θ d =  ( α c ,  α s , [ a –0 ,  a y ,  a h ,  a u ], [ b –0 ,  b y ,  b h ,  b u ],  σ a ,  σ b ,  ρ ab ) . 
B. Supply
In order to evaluate the counterfactuals for the social planner’s quality choices, 
we need to know the entire marginal cost function for each cable operator, not just 
the costs at the observed quality levels.26 Hence, we specify a flexible yet parsimo-
nious specification for the marginal cost function:
(20) mc( q cjn ,  Z cn ;  θ s ) = exp( c 0jn +  c 1jn q jcn ).
The exponential functional form is consistent with the cable systems’ facing tech-
nological capacity constraints when adding high-quality networks into their channel 
lineup.27
We follow the existing literature (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995) to gen-
erate moment restrictions for the supply-side. For a given vector of parameter val-
ues, we can solve the supply-side first-order conditions to obtain estimates of the 
marginal costs  ˆ  mccjn and  ∂ ˆ  mccjn /∂ q cjn , which in turn are used to compute  c ˆ0jn and  c ˆ1jn 
as follows:
  c ˆ0jn = ln ( ˆ  mccjn ) −  ∂ ˆ  mccjn /∂ q cjn ________  ˆ  mccjn   q cjn ,
  c ˆ1jn =  ∂ ˆ  mccjn /∂ q cjn ________  ˆ  mccjn  . 
26 As usual in these models, since we base estimation on suppliers’ first-order conditions, we cannot model their 
fixed costs. However, the data show that quality levels are not systematically higher in larger markets (the graphs are 
available upon request), implying that the scale of the firm is not playing a big role in its quality choices. 
27 The particular functional form chosen for the marginal cost function is not critical for the identification of 
model parameters. In principle, with more products for each producer, we could add additional parameters into the 
marginal cost function for a less parsimonious specification. 
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In turn, we assume that these coefficients can be specified as linear functions of 
observable cost shifters and a pair of structural error terms,  ( ν 0cjn ,  ν 1cjn ) .28 That is, 
we project  c ˆ0jn and  c ˆ1jn on  Z cn , i.e.,
  c ˆ0jn =  Z cjn  θ s0 +  ν 0cjn ,
  c ˆ1jn =  Z cjn  θ s1 +  ν 1cjn , 
to recover  ν 1cjn and  ν 2cjn satisfying
  E[ ν 0cjn |  Z cjn ] = E[ ν 1cjn |  Z cjn ] = 0. 
C. Instruments and Identification
As we discussed in Section IIIA, for each value of the parameter vector 
θ d , we solve for a pair of provider-specific structural errors,  ( ξ cn ,  ξ sn ) , and a set of 
 non-structural measurement errors,  u cjn , for cable providers using aggregate cable 
and satellite market shares, prices and observed quality levels for each tier offered, 
and  tier-specific cable market shares. On the supply side, we described in the pre-
vious section how we obtain, for each parameter vector, the pair of structural errors 
 ( ν 1cjn ,  ν 2cjn ) per product. Identification of the structural parameters relies on a set of 
conditional independence assumptions summarized by Assumption 2.29
ASSUMPTION 2: Unobservables and identifying assumptions:
 (i) For each service provider  g in market  n , the unobserved service characteris-
tics can be written as
  ξ gn =  α – g +  α gt +  ξ ̃gn ,
  where  α – g is provider-specific intercept,  α gt is provider-specific time effect, 
and  ( ξ ̃cn ,  ξ ̃sn ) satisfy the following mean independence assumptions,
  E[ ξ ̃cn |  Z –cn ] = E[ ξ ̃sn |  Z –sn ] = 0. 
 (ii) Measurement errors for markets with 2 and 3 cable products satisfy
 (21)  E[ u cjn |  Z –cn ] = 0, j = 1, 2. 
28 We refer to the errors as “structural” because they are observed by cable system before price and quality 
decisions are made. 
29 While the assumption suggests that the instrumental variables for cable and satellite innovations,  Z 
–
cn and  Z –sn , 
can be different (e.g., we can use own satellite price and quality as instruments for satellite own innovations) we use 
more conservative assumption that  Z 
–
sn =  Z –cn . 
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 (iii) Supply-side cost shocks for each product offered are linear functions of cost 
shifters,
  c 0jn =  Z –cn θ s0 +  ν 0cjn ,
  c 1jn =  Z –cn θ s1 +  ν 1cjn , 
  where
  E[ ν 0cjn |  Y – n ,  Z –cn ] = E[ ν 1cjn |  Y – n ,  Z –cn ] = 0. 
It is worth noting that in estimation we control for carrier-time demand side fixed 
effects,  α gt , i.e., we control for time effects, which vary by service provider (cable or 
satellite). Similarly, we use carrier-time dummies on the supply side as well, i.e.,  Z –cn 
contains these variables.
There is an obvious endogeneity problem because cable companies observe reali-
zations of ( ξ cn ,  ξ sn ) prior to making their price and quality choices. Therefore, prices 
and qualities are likely to be correlated with the unobserved service characteristics, 
ξ cn and  ξ sn . For finding instruments, we use the following arguments, adapted from 
Shcherbakov (2016).
First, we assume that the average prices and quality levels of other cable sys-
tems that belong to the same multiple system operator (MSO) are valid instrumental 
variables for prices and quality levels of the local provider. We assume that these 
variables are uncorrelated with the unobserved local market service characteristics, 
ξ ⋅n , but are reasonable proxies for the price and quality levels offered by the local 
cable system. Correlation in prices and quality levels across systems exists because 
the owner of several cable systems typically negotiates programming fees and other 
contract arrangements with programming networks on behalf of all of its members 
simultaneously. In turn, correlation in the marginal costs of systems within the same 
MSO justifies correlation in their price and quality levels. At the same time, for the 
instruments to be valid, one must ensure that the unobserved demand shocks,  ξ ⋅n are 
not correlated across markets. For example, this would be a concern if there were 
national advertising of cable products across the markets owned by a single MSO; 
fortunately for this specification, this is not the case in cable markets during our 
sample period.30
Second, different MSOs have different bargaining power in negotiations with 
programming networks. It may be that larger MSOs (i.e., those with more total 
subscribers) have stronger bargaining positions. Hence, we use the number of MSO 
subscribers as a cost shifter.31 Third, programming networks often sell bundles con-
sisting of several channels. The ability to purchase such bundles depends on the 
30 Crawford (2008) discusses this class of instruments in detail and why they work well in cable markets. 
31 Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) found that large MSOs were estimated to have more bargaining power than 
small MSOs and satellite providers. Indeed, the logic that larger systems are able to obtain better wholesale prices 
for channels underlies the choice of some of our demand-side instrumental variables. Such an effect could provide 
an alternative “cost-side” explanation for quality overprovision. However, one way to disentangle this from the 
“demand-side” quality overprovision of the Champsaur and Rochet (1989) theory is to note that the bargaining 
power story does not depend on DBS presence whereas, as we will demonstrate below, the quality overprovision 
we document obtains only when a DBS competitor is present. 
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system’s channel capacity. Thus, average channel capacity within an MSO should 
be correlated with the ability of their member-systems to get lower rates. By the 
same logic, we used own capacity level as another instrumental variable. Fourth, 
total length of own coaxial lines of the local cable systems is a proxy for the differ-
ences in maintenance costs incurred by the systems in areas with different densities 
of houses.
Our baseline set of instruments includes all of these variables. To demonstrate 
the effects of the instruments and for robustness, however, we also consider spec-
ifications in which all variables instrument for themselves (hereafter OLS-type 
instruments) and using a minimal set of instruments consisting only of the own-
ership-based (MSO) instruments (hereafter min-IV). These results are reported 
in Table 12 together with additional robustness checks for alternative measures of 
quality in Table 13.
There are three sets of moment conditions as described by Assumption (2): (i) 
moments associated with the unobserved product characteristics (i.e., demand-side 
shocks), (ii) moments associated with the supply-side shocks, and (iii) measure-
ment errors in conditional cable shares. Measurement errors in conditional cable 
product shares are uncorrelated with other variables by definition. We also assume 
no correlation between demand- and supply-side innovations. However, demand 
side unobservables for cable and satellite can be correlated with each other, i.e., 
 cov( ξ cn ,  ξ sn ) ≠ 0 . We exploit this information when constructing the weighting 
matrix and criterion function for the estimation.32 The structural parameters are 
estimated by GMM with an optimal weighting matrix.
V. Estimation Results
A. Parameter Estimates
Demand.—Table 5 summarizes our estimation results for two specifications. 
Specification (2) includes demographics at the market level, while specification 
(1) omits them. While demographic variables appear to be quite important deter-
minants of the price sensitivity, they are not statistically significant determinants 
of preferences for quality. Parameters of the distribution of unobserved consumer 
heterogeneity are statistically significant with tastes for quality having much wider 
dispersion than price sensitivity. Figure 2 describes the estimated distributions of 
price and quality parameters across markets.
Turning to the estimates for  ρ ab , the correlation between the random coefficients 
on price and quality, we see that without demographic controls, this correlation is 
an estimated −0.545, indicating that the most price sensitive consumers also have 
the greatest quality sensitivity.33 Once market-level demographics are included, the 
32 In particular, individual moments based on  ξ ̃cn and  ξ ̃sn are “stacked” horizontally and are treated as dis-
tinct moment conditions, i.e., averaging is done separately for cable and satellite moments. In contrast, in Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and the following literature, the averaging for the moment conditions is across the 
available products, which in our case would be the cable and satellite products. 
33 Trends in the home television market after the sample period offer evidence in line with this finding of negative 
correlation. In particular, in recent years the phenomenon of “cord cutting” has been documented, in which cable (and 
satellite, to a lesser extent) consumers have terminated their service in favor of outside options such as streaming ser-
vices (eg. Netflix, Apple TV, etc.). This practice is particularly pronounced among higher income, young  professionals 
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correlation in unobserved tastes for price and quality falls (in magnitude) to an 
estimated −0.481. Additionally, to illustrate the implications of these estimates of 
the consumer heterogeneity parameters on demand, Figures 8 and 9 display the 
and demonstrates that these individuals, who plausibly have higher tastes for quality, may be those who are most 
sensitive to cable prices. 
Table 5—Estimation Results 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
(1) (2)
Price coefficient, αip
 Mean −0.673 (0.008) −0.682 (0.035)
 Income −0.418 (0.147)
 Household size 0.396 (0.271)
 Urban −0.173 (0.177)
 Sigma 0.102 (0.018) 0.122 (0.018)
Price coefficient, αiq
 Mean 1.108 (0.121) 1.225 (0.241)
 Income −0.337 (0.777)
 Household size 0.221 (1.395)
 Urban 0.331 (0.917)
 Sigma 0.310 (0.020) 0.266 (0.048)
ρab −0.545 (0.128) −0.481 (0.049)
Demand t-dummies Yes Yes
Supply t-dummies Yes Yes
Notes: Reported are estimation results for key parameters from our structural model of demand, 
price, and quality choice. There are 12,214 observations, where an observation is a cable sys-
tem-product-year. Full estimation results can be found in Appendix C. Specification (1) does 
not include market demographics in preferences, while specification (2) does. Standard errors 
are clustered by market and listed in parentheses. Instruments include all those described in 
Section IVC; results using each variable as its own instrument (OLS-type) and a minimal set 
of instruments based on ownership (MSO) measures (min-IV) are presented in Appendix B. 
First-stage regressions are reported in Appendix D.
Figure 2. Distributions of Mean Price and Quality Parameters across Markets
Note: Reported are the estimated distributions of mean price and quality parameters across markets implied by the 
parameter estimates reported in Table 5.
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 consumer purchase probabilities for cable and satellite products for different con-
sumer types (as given by their random coefficient parameters).
Estimated own-price elasticities across markets average −5.2 for one-good mar-
kets, and −5.3 in multi-good (both 2 and 3 products) markets.34 The magnitude of 
these elasticities are similar to those found in the literature.35
Results for two alternative specifications are reported in Appendix B. In an OLS-
like specification, in which price and quality are treated as exogenous, yields a mean 
price coefficient of −0.553, showing that instrumenting has the expected effect of 
making estimated demand more elastic. A second alternative specification using a 
minimal set of instruments yields qualitatively similar results, but with larger stan-
dard errors. The estimated negative correlation  ρ ab is robust in these specifications. 
For this reason, we rely on our baseline specification presented in column 2 for our 
counterfactual simulations.
Supply.—The estimated distributions of marginal costs and their derivatives at 
observed quality levels are reported in Table 6. These suggest substantial variability 
in terms of technology levels (as implied by the cost function estimates) used by 
cable systems. Using these estimates, we construct a flexible estimate of a firm’s 
marginal cost function by using a flexible spline (Hermite) interpolation between 
the marginal cost levels and derivatives estimated at the observed quality levels, 
as reported in Table 6, and using the exponential specification (equation (20)) for 
extrapolation outside this range. Accordingly, for 1-product markets the marginal 
cost function is completely exponential. For 2- and 3-product markets it is exponen-
tial outside the range of the observed quality levels, and a monotone Hermite spline 
in-between. By doing this we are able to obtain a marginal cost function which uti-
lizes all the information from the estimates in Table 6, and yet is monotone, contin-
uous, and continuously differentiable, which are convenient features for computing 
counterfactuals.
Figure 3 shows estimated marginal cost functions for 1-, 2-, and 3-product firms 
implied by our estimates. As is apparent, high-quality systems on average have lower 
and flatter (less steeply increasing) marginal costs, perhaps as a result of using more 
advanced technology. Single-product firms have the highest and steepest marginal 
cost curves.
B. Welfare Effects from Endogenous Quality
To quantify firms’ quality distortions in this market, we need to compare observed 
outcomes with counterfactual ones given by a social planner. The social planner 
problem is to maximize total surplus, defined as the sum of consumer surplus and 
producer profit.
34 Histograms and further summary statistics for own price elasticities across markets are reported in Appendix 
A. Average estimated price-cost markups implied by these elasticity estimates are reported in Table 10. 
35 For example, Crawford et al. (2018) find elasticities ranging from −1.7 to −4.2 and Crawford and Yurukoglu 
(2012) find elasticities ranging from −4.1 to −6.3. The latter also cites additional papers that find elasticities rang-
ing from a low of −1.5 to −5.9, depending on the product and platform considered. 
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Let  α ip denote the price sensitivity of consumer type  i . The expected consumer 
surplus ( C S in ) for type  i in market  n is then defined as
(22)  E(C S in ) = − 1 __  α ip  E ϵ [ max gjn { u igjn }]
   = − 1 __  α ip ln (1 +  ∑ g=c, s exp ( δ gjn (  p gjn ,  q gjn ,  Y – in ,  ξ g ;  ω i })) ) , 
Table 6—Summary Statistics for the Supply-Side Estimates
Mean Median Min Max SD
System type: 1-product
mcc 0 16.81 17.15 0.03 46.79 5.79∂mcc 0/∂qc 0 1.90 1.90 1.03 2.96 0.13
System type: 2-product
mcc 0 13.36 11.44 0.00 70.42 9.42
mcc1 25.47 22.53 1.50 96.06 11.93∂mcc 0/∂qc 0 1.79 1.84 0.07 2.41 0.25∂mcc1/∂qc1 13.49 7.41 0.66 114.75 13.71
System type: 3-product
mcc 0 12.88 12.16 0.06 60.46 8.58
mcc1 28.61 26.31 2.20 99.36 12.97
mcc2 47.80 45.12 11.46 119.67 17.43∂mcc 0/∂qc 0 1.77 1.83 0.12 2.40 0.26∂mc1/∂qc1 4.03 3.64 0.27 14.31 1.89∂mcc2/∂qc2 20.79 16.73 2.04 129.47 14.74
Figure 3. Estimated Marginal Cost Functions by System Type
Note: Reported are the estimated marginal cost functions by system type (1-, 2-, or 3-product) and by product 
within each system type implied by the parameter estimates reported in Table 6.
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where  u igjn is given by equation (5), and the second line follows from the distribu-
tional assumption on  ϵ ign . Total consumer surplus in market  n is then obtained by 
integrating over the distribution of consumer heterogeneity, i.e.,
(23)  E(C S n ) = − ∫   
 
 1 __  α ip ln (1 +  ∑ g=c,s exp ( δ gjn (  p gjn ,  q gjn ,  Y – in ,  ξ g ;  ω i })) ) dF( ω i ). 
Accordingly, the first-order conditions for the social planner are
(24)  F.O.C . SP [  p cjn ]:  ∂ Π( · ) _____∂ p cjn  +  
∂E(C S n ) ______∂ p cjn  = 0,
(25) F.O.C . SP [ q cjn ]:  ∂ Π( · ) _____∂ q cjn  +  
∂E(C S n ) ______∂ q cjn  = 0,  
where  ∂ Π( · )/∂ p cjn and  ∂ Π( · )/∂ q cjn were given earlier by the left-hand sides of 
equations (14) and (15) respectively.
We calculate the optimal social planner’s quality and price using (24) and (25), 
given our estimates of consumer preferences and operator cost functions described 
in the previous section. The results are summarized in Table 7. Table 11 reports 
detailed factual and counterfactual price and quality levels.
Turning first to column 1, we find, at observed prices, monopoly cable operators 
underprovide (or degrade) quality: the quality of low-quality products provided by 
a social planner are predicted to increase by 55 percent, while qualities for  medium- 
and high-quality products by are predicted to increase by 7 percent. Consumers 
surplus increases by an estimated 43 percent, firm profits fall by an estimated 33 
percent, and total surplus increases by an estimated 10 percent. The quality degra-
dation finding here is not surprising as, with prices fixed, the socially optimal quality 
level is that at which the marginal cost of quality is exactly equal to the price; hence, 
for the monopolist to overprovide quality at fixed prices is impossible as that would 
imply setting quality at a level where the marginal cost of quality exceeds the price, 
which neither the monopolist nor social planner would do.
In column 2, we hold fixed qualities at the social optimum levels, and consider 
lowering prices from the observed levels to marginal cost (the socially optimal price 
level). The results indicate that market power over price is also important. Prices fall 
between an estimated 33 percent and 74 percent, consumer surplus rises by an esti-
mated 54 percent, profits are eliminated by marginal cost pricing, and total surplus 
increases by 7 percent.
Column 3 contains the most interesting patterns. The results from the third coun-
terfactual show that, when the social planner jointly sets prices and qualities, he 
would set quality levels to be lower than the monopolists’ choices, i.e., the opposite 
of the quality degradation shown in column A. On average, socially optimal qualities 
would be lower by between 23 percent and 55 percent compared to observed values 
(and by between 45 percent and 58 percent compared to the social planner’s qualities 
at observed prices in column 1). This suggests that cable companies are offering con-
sumers overly large bundles of channels at correspondingly inflated prices; instead 
consumers would prefer smaller (lower-quality) bundles at lower prices. At the social 
optimum, consumer surplus more than doubles (+116  percent): an effect far greater 
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than the effect of efficient qualities or prices on their own, and total surplus increases 
by an estimated 17 percent.
Furthermore, when we examine the overprovision result market-by-market, we 
find that multi-product cable firms tend to overprovide quality more often than 
 single-product systems. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which describes the fre-
quency of under- and overprovision in 1-, 2-, and 3-product markets. It is evident 
from these graphs that there is a much higher preponderance of quality overprovi-
sion in multi-good markets, compared to single-good markets. Panel A of Figure 4, 
corresponding to single-product markets, has most of its mass at positive values of 
the normalized quality difference  
 q TS−max −  q π−max   __________ q π−max  , implying quality degradation; in 
contrast, the remaining histograms, corresponding to two- and three-good markets, 
have most of the mass at negative values, implying quality overprovision.
Such results are new and surprising relative to the literature. The classic results 
from Mussa and Rosen (1978) predict only quality degradation. However, Spence 
(1975) shows that a monopolist can choose to overprovide quality (relative to the 
social planner) depending on the curvature of the demand curve Moreover, in a 
modified Mussa-Rosen model in which consumers have a high-end outside option, 
Champsaur and Rochet (1989, Section 3) show that the monopolist can optimally 
overprovide quality. In the next section we explore these potential explanations for 
our quality overprovision result.
VI. Inside the Black Box: Explaining Quality Overprovision
The quality overprovision from the previous section is at odds with the results 
from the screening literature described in Section I, which typically predicts quality 
degradation for low consumer types and no distortions at the top. In this section 
Table 7—Welfare Effects of Market Power over Quality (and Price) 
Market power 
over quality
Market power 
over price
 
Total welfare effect
( pObs, qObs) vs. ( pObs, qSP) ( pObs, qSP) vs. ( pSP, qSP) ( pObs, qObs) vs. ( pSP, qSP)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3)
Prices
Low-quality products – – −0.330 0.180 −0.330 0.180
Medium-quality products – – −0.590 0.220 −0.590 0.220
High-quality products – – −0.740 0.130 −0.740 0.130
Qualities
Low-quality products 0.550 0.720 – – −0.230 0.910
Medium-quality products 0.070 0.110 – – −0.370 0.410
High-quality products 0.070 0.040 – – −0.550 0.260
Welfare
Consumer surplus 0.430 0.290 0.540 0.420 1.160 0.520
Profit −0.330 0.240 −1.000 – −1.000 –
Total surplus 0.100 0.060 0.070 0.050 0.170 0.070
Note: Numbers in this table are proportional changes, relative to the baseline scenarios (at observed prices and 
qualities).
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we assess possible explanations for the quality overprovision that we find. One is 
provided by Spence (1975) where the marginal valuation of quality increases more 
for high-willingness-to-pay consumers. An alternative to this preference-based 
explanation is one provided by Champsaur and Rochet (1989), who show that when 
the monopolist faces competition from a high-end competitor offering consumers 
a high-quality outside option (in contrast to the low-quality outside option assumed 
in most nonlinear pricing models), then it may optimally choose to distort qualities 
upward relative to the first-best. Indeed, in the cable setting, the relevant outside 
option is satellite TV, which is reasonable to characterize as a high-end product (as 
satellite TV bundles typically offer more channels).
Given that our quality overprovision result goes against conventional wisdom 
in much of the nonlinear pricing literature, we also examine its robustness. In this 
section we report results from a wide range of simulations to examine the robustness 
of the quality overprovision result to changes in key demand model parameters. 
Specifically, we estimated a negative correlation (i.e.,  ρ < 0 ) between the random 
coefficients on prices and quality in the demand model. Since it is well recognized in 
the demand estimation literature that the parameters in the covariance matrix of ran-
dom coefficients may be delicately identified,36 we perform these robustness checks 
to ensure that our quality overprovision result is not just a spurious artifact arising 
from the potentially poor identification of these preference parameters.
Since quality overprovision arises primarily in multi-good markets (as shown in 
Figure 4), we investigate these concerns in a 2-product system. For our benchmark 
2-product system, we use Evansville, IL in 1997, in which the cable monopolist was 
Falcon Cable TV.37
Figure 5 presents the results of our simulations for this market. For a wide range 
of possible values of the correlation parameter  ρ ∈ [−0.9, 0.9] we compute prof-
it-maximizing price and quality levels  p cj π−max and  q cj π−max , respectively. We do this 
under the situation when the DBS competitor is present in the market and under the 
alternative market structure, where there is no DBS competitor. Then, we calculate 
socially optimal price and quality levels  p cj SP−max and  q cj SP−max , for situations with 
36 For that reason, many applications of random coefficient demand models assume that the random coefficients 
are independent, i.e., have a diagonal covariance matrix. 
37 This market is representative of all 2-product markets in the sense of having smallest Euclidean distance from 
simple average of each characteristics across systems with the same number of products. 
Figure 4. Quality Inflation for Each Product by Type of Cable System
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and without competition from satellite providers. With these quantities we can now 
illustrate how the degree of under-/overprovision changes for different values of the 
correlation parameter and how this relationship is affected by competition.
It is apparent that the overprovision result is present for any value of the correla-
tion parameter. Interestingly, comparing the two graphs in Figure 5, the presence 
of a DBS competitor leads the multi-product cable firm to overprovide quality of 
both products not only relative to the social planner, but also relative to the qual-
ity levels it would choose if the DBS competitor were removed. For example, for 
the high-quality product ( q high ) we see that, across all values of  ρ , the monopolist 
chooses a quality level roughly 80 percent higher than what the social planner 
chooses when the DBS competitor is present, whereas removing the DBS com-
petition causes the monopolist to choose lower-quality levels identical to that of 
the social planner. The key takeaway here is that the presence of satellite compe-
tition leads cable firms to offer significantly higher-quality levels, thus confirming 
Champsaur and Rochet’s model.
In essence, quality overprovision can be interpreted as a business stealing strat-
egy on the part of cable companies vis-á-vis their satellite competitors. An important 
feature of satellite competition is that satellite companies offer identical products at 
identical prices across all geographic markets. Because of this, a profit-maximizing 
monopolist has, relative to the social planner, an incentive to provide higher-quality 
products similar to those of the satellite competitor at lower prices without fearing 
reprisals from the satellite company.38 However, providing products comparable in 
quality to high-end satellite products requires a high level of cost-efficiency; there-
fore not all cable firms will engage in it; only more cost-efficient ones will. Our cost 
estimates, illustrated in Figure 3, show that two- and three-product cable systems 
tend to be more cost efficient than one-product providers. Hence, we would expect 
38 Indeed, when one of the 11,000 local cable firm changes its policy it is very unlikely that satellite competitors 
will respond by changing their national prices and quality levels in response. 
Figure 5
Note: Benchmark two-product market (Evansville, IL; 1997): profit and TS maximizing cable quality for monopo-
list with (panel A) and without (panel B) the presence of DBS competitor.
−1
0
1
2
O
pt
im
al
 q
ua
lit
y
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
Correlation parameter, ρ(αip, αiq) 
Panel A. With DBS competitor
−1
0
1
2
O
pt
im
al
 q
ua
lit
y
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
Correlation parameter, ρ(αip, αiq) 
Panel B. Without DBS competitor
 q  high TS−max 
 q  high TS−max 
low
  q  low TS−max   q  low TS−max 
  q  high pi−max 
  q  high pi−max   q   pi−max 
low  q   pi−max 
981CRAWFORD ET AL.: QUALITY OVERPROVISION IN CABLE TELEVISION MARKETSVOL. 109 NO. 3
a higher preponderance of quality overprovision in multi-product markets, which 
is precisely what we find in Figure 4: cable quality is typically overprovided in 
multi-product markets but underprovided in single-product markets.39
While we have focused here on quality overprovision in multi-good markets, 
the theory in Spence (1975) shows that quality overprovision can also arise in 
 single-good monopoly markets. We conclude this section by testing Spence’s 
results. While Figure 4 shows that there are not many single-product markets in 
which quality overprovision is present, we consider one such market (Austin, TX) 
in which overprovision does occur. Figure 6 is analogous to Figure 5, and shows 
that, similarly to the previous results, when we take away satellite competition, 
then the quality overprovision result essentially disappears.40
To consider whether Spence’s results are relevant here, we use Proposition 1 
from Spence (1975), which states that for a single-product monopolist a sufficient 
 condition for quality underprovision is that  ∂ 2 P/∂ q ∂ s < 0 , i.e., that the cross-par-
tial of the inverse demand function with respect to quality and quantity is nega-
tive. For our demand model, we used the implicit function theorem to compute this 
cross-partial derivative for different values of the correlation coefficient as plotted 
in Figure 6.
Interestingly, in the absence of DBS competition (panel B) we see that the value 
of  ∂ P/∂ q ∂ s is positive (green dash line) when the monopolist overprovides quality 
and negative when the monopolist underprovides quality, which is exactly in line 
with the Spence model. In the presence of DBS competition, however, Spence’s 
proposition no longer holds, and we see from panel A that in this case a profit-max-
imizing monopolist would choose to overprovide quality for a wide range of values 
of  ρ even when the cross-partial is negative.
39 Out of 7,100 one-product market observations, we found that cable firms overprovide quality in only about 
20 percent. The overprovision result is much stronger in two- and three- product markets, where quality is inflated 
in 85 percent and 95 percent of observations, respectively. 
40 Appendix Section AE provides similar simulations for four additional markets, which show the robustness of 
the conclusions in this section across different values of  ρ . 
Figure 6
Notes: Single-product market (Austin, TX): profit and TS maximizing cable quality for monopolist with (panel A) 
and without (panel B) the presence of a DBS competitor. Shaded area to the left of the red line describes the range 
of parameter values where a profit-maximizing firm would overprovide quality relative to the first best.
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While the results to this point have discussed specific individual markets, 
they are robust across the markets in our sample. Specifically, Figure 7 reports 
 ( q TS−max −  q π−max )/ q π−max , the percentage difference between socially-optimal 
and profit-maximizing quality levels when DBS is absent across all the markets in 
our data.41
The results clearly demonstrate the robustness of our result that quality over-
provision only occurs in the presence of a DBS competitor. We see that for all 1-, 
2-, and 3-product markets, the mass of the histograms are primarily in the pos-
itive region, indicating that firms would engage in quality degradation (i.e., set-
ting  profit-maximizing qualities lower than socially optimal) in the absence of DBS 
competition. This is a dramatic difference compared to the widespread evidence of 
quality overprovision in the presence of DBS competition shown in Figure 4.
41 Note that both of these are counterfactual qualities, which are simulated from the structural model. 
Figure 7. Quality Inflation for Each Product by Type of Cable System: Socially Optimal  
and Profit Maximizing If DBS Is Out
Note: Quality inflation is defined in percentage terms as the difference between socially optimal and profit-maxi-
mizing quality level when DBS is eliminated from the market.
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To sum up, our explorations in this section have shown that the quality overpro-
vision which we have documented in cable TV markets appears to arise from cable 
companies’ efforts to compete effectively with a high-end outside option (satellite 
TV); this is consistent with the theoretical results in Champsaur and Rochet (1989). 
Moreover, even in single-good markets, our results confirm Spence’s (1975) finding 
that the monopolist can over- or underprovide quality depending on the curvature of 
the inverse demand function. These results are robust across values of the  ρ param-
eter, which suggests that the quality overprovision result is not merely a function of 
the estimated correlation in preferences for price and quality, but depends critically 
on the presence and nature of competition with high-quality (satellite) competitors.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a model of consumer and producer behavior to measure 
the distortions in product quality in imperfectly competitive markets for paid tele-
vision services. We estimate demand- and supply-side structural parameters using 
data from the US local cable markets in 1997–2006. Via counterfactual simulations, 
we find that cable companies set both prices and qualities too high relative to the 
social optimum: qualities between 23 percent and 55 percent and prices between 33 
percent and 74 percent. Cable customers are facing overly large bundles at inflated 
prices, and would prefer smaller bundles with lower prices. These are important 
insights into how consumers trade off price versus quality and may be particularly 
relevant to US policymakers concerned about high and rising pay television prices.
Our finding that a monopolist can overprovide quality is novel relative to the exist-
ing empirical literature. Further investigations show that this result is driven by the 
presence of a high-end outside option represented by satellite products, thus provid-
ing empirical support for the theoretical results in Champsaur and Rochet (1989).
Our results point the way to several possible extensions. Based on features of the 
institutional environment, we take the number of products offered by firms as fixed. 
We assume consumers have preferences over a scalar “quality” variable, and extend-
ing our framework to allow for heterogeneous tastes across multiple different televi-
sion networks would be useful. Consumer demand in television markets can exhibit 
dynamic features, such as state dependence or switching costs, and extending our 
analysis to examine firms’ quality choices under richer demand specifications would 
be fruitful.42 Finally, we focus on the quality (and price) choices of downstream dis-
tributors, taking as given the qualities of upstream television networks; generalizing 
the analysis to those firms’ quality choices would also be of interest.
Appendix A. Additional Results
A. Additional Reduced-Form Evidence of Quality Inflation
Here we present some additional reduced-form evidence regarding the extent 
of quality overprovision by cable monopolists facing satellite competition. Table 8 
42 Shcherbakov (2016) estimates a dynamic demand model for television markets. 
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presents regressions in which the dependent variable is the quality level for each of 
the available product tiers. The key independent variables are dummy variables for 
years before and after the year in which the cable system’s DBS competitor begins 
carrying local channels.
While not all the parameters on these dummy variables are precisely estimated, 
we find that statistically significant post-intro coefficients are all positive, which 
we expect if cable firms inflate quality when facing a more competitive high-end 
alternative. Interestingly, in multi-product markets, the coefficients in the post-intro 
dummies are larger in magnitude for higher-quality products, which is consistent 
with our structural estimates from Section V.
B. Surplus and Buying Probabilities across Consumer Types
Purchase Probabilities.—We created heat map graphs for representative 1- and 
2-product markets, discussed in Section VI. Taking satellite TV as the highest qual-
ity product, we see that consumers who have the highest probability of buying sat-
ellite (i.e., the yellow blocks in panel B of both Figures 8 and 9) are primarily 
those with intermediate values for the quality coefficient. In comparison, consumers 
with high-quality coefficients are most likely to buy lower-quality cable products, as 
shown in panel A in Figures 8 and 9.
Consumers Surplus.—To illustrate the type-specific surplus distribution in our 
multi-dimensional model, we created surface graphs measuring expected consumer 
surplus in dollar equivalent as a function of the heterogeneity parameters  α ip and α iq (price and quality sensitivity, respectively). Figure 10 illustrates consumer sur-
plus distribution for the same 1- and 2-product markets we used for analysis in 
Section VI.
Table 8—Cable Quality Changes around Local Channels Intro by DBS
1-product 2-product 3-product
q  q low  q high  q low  q med  q high 
Intro year + 2 and after 0.089 0.265 0.405 0.452 0.587 0.762
(0.098) (0.078) (0.089) (0.108) (0.143) (0.160)
Intro year + 1 0.207 0.203 0.193 −0.207 −0.348 −0.328
(0.101) (0.156) (0.180) (0.247) (0.326) (0.364)
Intro year −0.040 0.138 0.344 0.263 0.298 0.521
(0.082) (0.130) (0.150) (0.210) (0.278) (0.310)
Intro year − 1 0.157 0.037 0.047 0.185 0.041 −0.044
(0.069) (0.095) (0.110) (0.171) (0.226) (0.252)
Intro year − 2 0.144 0.257 0.194 −0.300 −0.090 −0.163
(0.056) (0.101) (0.116) (0.242) (0.319) (0.356)
Constant 2.481 1.351 3.405 1.930 2.961 4.868
(0.029) (0.051) (0.058) (0.114) (0.150) (0.168)
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,140 3,693 3,693 1,381 1,381 1,381
R2 0.191 0.625 0.341 0.157 0.576 0.554
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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In these figures we see that generally, consumers with high WTP for quality and 
low price sensitivity gain the highest consumer surplus (shown as bright yellow 
in the graphs), while those with low WTP for quality obtain low consumer sur-
plus, regardless of price sensitivity (shown as dark blue/purple). The latter result is 
Figure 8. Heat Map and Surface for Probability of Buying Cable and DBS, 2-Product Market
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Figure 9. Heat Map and Surface for Probability of Buying Cable and DBS, 1-Product Market
Figure 10. Distribution of Consumer Surplus in 1- and 2-Product Markets
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 perhaps not surprising, as consumers with low WTP for quality purchase the low-
end outside option, and obtain low surplus.
C. Price Elasticity and Markups
D. Details: Factual and Counterfactual Price and Quality Levels
Table 11 provides the full set of prices and qualities underlying the results pre-
sented in Table 7 in the main text.
E. Additional Simulations of Quality Distortions with and without DBS Competitor
In this section, we have computed the profit-maximizing and social-optimal 
levels of quality across different values of the correlation parameter  ρ , for several 
additional markets. They are shown in Figure 12. We computed the figures for two 
additional 1-product markets and two additional 2-product markets. For these mar-
kets, we don’t always see quality overprovision: in observation 6,274 and 7,233, for 
instance, there is always quality degradation, both when DBS is present or absent. 
But in both cases, quality degradation is larger when DBS is absent, which is the 
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Figure 11. Histogram for Average Price Elasticities
Note: Three graphs show, respectively, distributions of weighted own price elasticities across markets with 1, 2, or 
3 products.
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direction that we would expect. The other two markets present results qualitatively 
similar to those presented in Section VI. Despite their slight differences, the main 
point of these additional simulations is that the primary conclusions of the paper are 
robust across different values of  ρ .
Table 9—Summary Statistics for Weighted Average Own Price Elasticity by 
Product Type across Markets
Mean Median Min Max SD
1-product markets −5.15 −4.50 −100.72 −0.43 5.62
2-product markets −5.26 −4.06 −67.70 −0.45 4.27
3-product markets −5.28 −4.06 −66.61 −0.70 5.43
Notes: To calculate the statistics for multi-product cable systems, we use product-specific mar-
ket shares as the weights. 
Table 10—Estimated Price Markups
Price markups
Observations Mean SD
1-product markets 7,105 0.264 0.139
2-product markets
 Low-quality products 3,615 0.320 0.202
 High-quality products 3,615 0.226 0.100
3-product markets
 Low-quality products 1,327 0.339 0.188
 Medium-quality products 1,327 0.174 0.101
 High-quality products 1,327 0.210 0.095
Notes: Reported are estimated price markups from our baseline estimation results (Table 5, 
column 2). Price markups are reported as a percentage of price, ( pj − mcj)/pj. Estimated val-
ues are averaged across markets by market type (1-, 2-, or 3-product markets) and product type 
within market type.
Table 11—Factual and Counterfactual Levels of Price and Quality
( po, qo) ( ps, qo) ( po, q s) ( ps, q s)
1-product
  p low 22.34 16.81 22.34 17.14
  q low 3.26 3.26 4.70 3.44
2-product
  p low 18.08 13.44 18.08 10.91
  q low 3.07 3.07 3.46 1.57
  p high 33.30 26.05 33.30 14.40
  q high 5.25 5.25 5.69 3.54
3-product
  p low 18.19 12.85 18.19 10.08
  q low 2.55 2.55 3.35 0.90
  p med 33.85 28.61 33.85 12.99
  q med 7.36 7.36 7.66 2.74
  p high 61.00 47.82 61.00 15.29
  q high 9.13 9.13 9.71 3.88
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Appendix B. Robustness Checks
A. Alternative Sets of Instrumental Variables
Table 12 reports parameter estimates for two alternative specifications (both 
GMM second stage). The first one is OLS-type where price and quality variables 
were used as own instruments. In order to identify parameters of consumer hetero-
geneity, we used additional instruments such as MSO-based average quality and 
average price for each product.
To obtain estimates for the second specification, min-IV, we used a minimal set of 
instrumental variables (only ownership-based instruments were employed). OLS-
type specification results in smaller magnitudes for the price coefficients, similarly 
to the attenuation bias one would expect in a linear model. Estimation results from 
the min-IV specification turn out to be quite similar to the ones reported in the main 
text.
B. Alternative Measures of Quality
We provide comparison of estimation results under our original and two alterna-
tive measures of quality in Table 13. In particular, column 1 reproduces the results 
of our original specification. Column 2 assigns weight of 0 to any free-of-charge 
channel, i.e., measures quality as the total cost of nonfree channels in a bundle. 
Finally, column 3 assigns weight of 0.1 to each channel in the bundle.43 As the 
results indicate, the results are quantitatively and qualitatively robust across these 
alternative measures of quality.
43 We chose this weight to obtain levels of quality that are roughly similar to our original measure. 
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Table 12—Results for Alternative Specifications, 1997–2006 (12,214 Observations)
OLS-type Min-IV
Parameter Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Price coefficient,  α ip 
Mean −0.553 (0.000) −0.684 (0.011)
Income −0.304 (0.027) −0.433 (0.022)
Household size 0.190 (0.017) 0.415 (0.054)
Urban −0.161 (0.029) −0.184 (0.036)
Sigma 0.100 (0.003) 0.119 (0.011)
Quality coefficient,  α iq 
Mean 1.105 (0.041) 1.228 (0.092)
Income −0.265 (0.265) −0.336 (0.807)
Household size 0.459 (0.200) 0.227 (0.387)
Urban −0.003 (0.276) 0.334 (0.888)
Sigma 0.352 (0.003) 0.268 (0.011)
ρab −0.669 (0.010) −0.451 (0.013)
Demand t-dummies Yes Yes
Supply t-dummies Yes Yes
Note: Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
Table 13—Robustness Checks for Alternative Measures of Quality
Original Nonfree only Number of channels
Parameter (1) (2) (3)
Mean −0.673 −0.727 −0.720
 (Standard error) (0.008) (0.047) (0.031)
Sigma 0.102 0.135 0.128
 (Standard error) (0.018) (0.030) (0.033)
Quality coefficient,αiq
Mean 1.108 1.265 0.881
 (Standard error) (0.121) (0.110) (0.180)
Sigma 0.310 0.368 0.391
 (Standard error) (0.020) (0.087) (0.081)
ρab −0.545 −0.333 −0.351
 (Standard error) (0.128) (0.326) (0.313)
Demand t-dummies Yes Yes Yes
Supply t-dummies Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix C. Full Estimation Results
Table 14—Estimation Results, 1997–2006 (Observations 12,214)
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Parameter (1) (2)
Price coefficient, αip
 Mean −0.673 (0.008) −0.682 (0.035)
 Income −0.418 (0.147)
 Household size 0.396 (0.271)
 Urban −0.173 (0.177)
 Sigma 0.102 (0.018) 0.122 (0.018)
Quality coefficient, αiq
 Mean 1.108 (0.121) 1.225 (0.241)
 Income −0.337 (0.777)
 Household size 0.221 (1.395)
 Urban 0.331 (0.917)
 Sigma 0.310 (0.020) 0.266 (0.048)
corr(aip, aiq) −0.545 (0.128) −0.481 (0.049)
Demand cab t-dummies
 Const. 10.313 (0.349) 10.218 (0.479)
 y-1998 0.650 (0.259) 0.590 (0.266)
 y-1999 2.022 (0.288) 1.879 (0.305)
 y-2000 1.961 (0.327) 1.815 (0.346)
 y-2001 1.607 (0.366) 1.415 (0.384)
 y-2002 −0.294 (0.397) −0.415 (0.671)
 y-2003 1.976 (0.473) 2.038 (0.584)
 y-2004 2.596 (0.720) 2.631 (0.808)
 y-2005 0.243 (1.302) 0.040 (1.369)
 y-2006 1.165 (0.704) 1.002 (0.809)
Demand sat t-dummies
 Const. 5.994 (0.301) 5.915 (0.418)
 y-1998 0.351 (0.057) 0.339 (0.072)
 y-1999 1.072 (0.062) 1.062 (0.134)
 y-2000 0.016 (0.536) −0.581 (0.629)
 y-2001 0.273 (0.496) −0.354 (0.575)
 y-2002 2.698 (0.825) 1.773 (0.993)
 y-2003 9.980 (0.883) 9.172 (0.979)
 y-2004 7.866 (1.047) 6.935 (1.174)
 y-2005 7.043 (1.139) 5.690 (1.277)
 y-2006 6.364 (1.169) 5.101 (1.342)
(continued)
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Table 14—Estimation Results, 1997–2006 (Observations 12,214) (continued)
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Parameter (1) (2)
Supply parameters, c0j
 Const. 1.779 (1.280) 0.960 (1.497)
 y-1998 0.017 (0.260) −0.132 (0.303)
 y-1999 −0.313 (1.338) −0.049 (0.304)
 y-2000 0.051 (0.344) 0.071 (0.223)
 y-2001 0.131 (0.361) 0.109 (0.207)
 y-2002 −1.952 (3.218) −0.917 (1.991)
 y-2003 −0.535 (0.869) −0.575 (0.655)
 y-2004 0.078 (0.647) 0.089 (0.566)
 y-2005 −0.219 (1.385) −0.158 (1.119)
 y-2006 −0.204 (0.809) −0.110 (0.563)
  MSO (p0) 0.448 (0.337) 0.568 (0.204)
  MSO (p1) −0.696 (0.587) −0.648 (0.254)
  MSO (p2) 0.454 (0.629) 0.195 (0.312)
  MSO (q0) −0.651 (4.754) 0.245 (4.096)
  MSO (q1) 0.717 (2.810) 0.146 (1.248)
  MSO (q2) −2.528 (7.490) 0.147 (3.287)
 MSO sub. 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
 MSO cap. 0.011 (0.030) 0.015 (0.019)
 MSO num. prod. −0.304 (0.435) −0.234 (0.504)
 Own cap. −0.002 (0.015) 0.000 (0.005)
 Own m.coax. −0.031 (0.360) −0.017 (0.216)
Supply parameters, c1j
 Const. 0.370 (1.236) 0.523 (0.375)
 y-1998 −0.044 (0.248) 0.042 (0.102)
 y-1999 0.040 (0.223) 0.011 (0.136)
 y-2000 −0.015 (0.231) −0.022 (0.055)
 y-2001 −0.041 (0.136) −0.032 (0.052)
 y-2002 1.085 (2.282) 0.139 (0.349)
 y-2003 0.214 (0.633) 0.103 (0.127)
 y-2004 0.100 (0.509) −0.035 (0.105)
 y-2005 0.137 (0.923) −0.013 (0.209)
 y-2006 0.048 (0.574) −0.055 (0.094)
  MSO (p0) 0.098 (0.800) −0.082 (0.046)
  MSO (p1) 0.286 (0.213) 0.195 (0.073)
  MSO (p2) −0.212 (0.341) −0.026 (0.080)
  MSO (q0) −1.339 (9.408) −0.429 (1.017)
  MSO (q1) −0.365 (1.454) 0.049 (0.326)
  MSO (q2) 1.674 (2.824) 0.016 (0.765)
 MSO sub. −0.000 (0.000) −0.000 (0.000)
 MSO cap. −0.003 (0.013) −0.003 (0.004)
 MSO num. prod. −0.059 (0.383) 0.006 (0.092)
 Own cap. 0.000 (0.012) −0.001 (0.001)
 Own m.coax. 0.017 (0.253) −0.001 (0.032)
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Appendix D. First-Stage Regressions
Table 15—First-Stage Regressions
Variables pc 0 pc1 pc2 qc 0 qc1 qc2
 MSO (p0) 1.713 1.491 1.692 −0.905 0.322 0.610(0.151) (0.194) (0.317) (0.0329) (0.0357) (0.0478)
 MSO (p1) −4.642 17.87 −9.870 −1.000 1.870 −1.711(0.156) (0.201) (0.327) (0.0339) (0.0369) (0.0493)
 MSO (p2) 2.623 0.515 20.49 0.0896 −0.312 2.268(0.201) (0.258) (0.421) (0.0437) (0.0475) (0.0634)
 MSO (q0) 25.06 −68.72 −10.98 11.72 −11.61 −6.745(2.749) (3.531) (5.757) (0.597) (0.649) (0.867)
 MSO (q1) 11.50 −17.67 −10.69 2.259 −3.172 −2.113(1.000) (1.285) (2.095) (0.217) (0.236) (0.316)
 MSO (q2) −6.523 2.201 −44.70 −0.410 1.447 −5.210(1.130) (1.452) (2.367) (0.245) (0.267) (0.357)
MSO sub −0.000122 0.000108 0.000309 −2.19e-05 6.82e-05 8.61e-05
(1.66e-05) (2.14e-05) (3.48e-05) (3.61e-06) (3.93e-06) (5.25e-06)
MSO cap. 0.182 0.135 −0.135 0.0328 0.0128 −0.0166
(0.00914) (0.0117) (0.0191) (0.00198) (0.00216) (0.00288)
MSO num. prod. −3.177 0.339 19.56 −0.523 0.984 2.556
(0.298) (0.383) (0.624) (0.0647) (0.0703) (0.0940)
Own cap. 0.00801 0.0574 0.163 0.00560 0.0244 0.0249
(0.00378) (0.00486) (0.00792) (0.000821) (0.000893) (0.00119)
Own cable len. −0.648 1.382 5.129 −0.192 0.481 0.735
(0.116) (0.149) (0.242) (0.0251) (0.0273) (0.0365)
Constant 8.887 4.650 −21.70 0.916 −0.720 −2.677
(0.856) (1.100) (1.792) (0.186) (0.202) (0.270)
t = 1998 −0.260 0.810 0.841 −0.00559 0.341 0.247
(0.203) (0.261) (0.425) (0.0441) (0.0479) (0.0640)
t = 1999 1.450 1.272 0.911 0.341 0.638 0.362
(0.212) (0.273) (0.445) (0.0461) (0.0501) (0.0670)
t = 2000 0.955 3.000 1.440 0.259 0.912 0.447
(0.243) (0.312) (0.508) (0.0527) (0.0573) (0.0766)
t = 2001 1.025 3.404 2.314 0.221 0.997 0.549
(0.257) (0.331) (0.539) (0.0558) (0.0607) (0.0812)
t = 2002 −1.545 3.663 0.0802 0.265 1.128 0.391
(0.302) (0.388) (0.632) (0.0655) (0.0712) (0.0952)
t = 2003 7.517 16.30 −0.463 2.091 2.932 1.067
(0.361) (0.464) (0.756) (0.0783) (0.0852) (0.114)
t = 2004 9.301 20.47 1.059 2.230 4.144 2.339
(0.460) (0.591) (0.963) (0.0999) (0.109) (0.145)
t = 2005 6.693 13.71 9.768 1.805 3.154 3.248
(0.766) (0.984) (1.604) (0.166) (0.181) (0.242)
t = 2006 8.257 18.60 −1.830 2.779 4.228 1.781
(0.413) (0.531) (0.865) (0.0897) (0.0975) (0.130)
Observations 12,214 12,214 12,214 12,214 12,214 12,214
R2 0.260 0.792 0.550 0.365 0.776 0.553
F-value 214.3 2,326 745.2 350.6 2,115 755.6
F-test 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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